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Abstract: Information and collaboration patterns embedded in social networks 
play key roles in multilevel and polycentric modes of governance. However, mod-
eling the dynamics of such social networks in multilevel settings has been seldom 
addressed in the literature. Here we use an adaptive social network model to elab-
orate the interplay between a central and a local government in order to maintain 
a polycentric governance. More specifically, our analysis explores in what ways 
specific policy choices made by a central agent affect the features of an emerging 
social network composed of local organizations and local users. Using two types 
of stylized policies, adaptive co-management and adaptive one-level manage-
ment, we focus on the benefits of multi-level adaptive cooperation for network 
management. Our analysis uses viability theory to explore and to quantify the 
ability of these policies to achieve specific network properties. Viability theory 
gives the family of policies that enables maintaining the polycentric governance 
unlike optimal control that gives a unique blueprint. We found that the viability 
of the policies can change dramatically depending on the goals and features of 
the social network. For some social networks, we also found a very large differ-
ence between the viability of the adaptive one-level management and adaptive 
co-management policies. However, results also show that adaptive co-manage-
ment doesn’t always provide benefits. Hence, we argue that applying viability 
theory to governance networks can help policy design by analyzing the trade-off 
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between the costs of adaptive co-management and the benefits associated with its 
 ability to maintain desirable social network properties in a polycentric governance 
framework.
Keywords: Adaptive co-management, adaptive social network, polycentric gov-
ernance, viability framework
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1. Introduction
In what ways does the interplay between central and local governments affect the 
features of multilevel social networks? As we will elaborate below, this is one of 
the most crucial questions in current discussions about the benefits and drawbacks 
of polycentric governance (Giest and Howlett 2014; Schoon et al. 2015). 
Ostrom et al. (1961) pioneered the theoretical concept of polycentric gover-
nance for addressing the issues of organizing co-operation among multiple lev-
els of government. Polycentric systems are characterized by several governing 
authorities (rather than a monocentric unit), featuring multiple and overlapping 
jurisdictions at different scales (Ostrom 2010; Koontz et al. 2015; Schoon et al. 
2015). It has been proposed that these types of systems are well-suited for the 
governance of dynamic natural resources due to their adaptability and capacities 
for self-organization and learning (Folke et al. 2005; Andersson and Ostrom 2008). 
Despite advances in our understanding of the emergence and impacts of mul-
tilevel linkages in polycentric governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Cash et al. 
2006), the role of social networks in these multilevel governance settings remain 
unclear. For example, it has been repeatedly been proposed that the policies imple-
mented by a central agent (such as a national government) are likely to affect the 
evolution and the features of local organizations and networks (e.g. Ostrom 1990; 
Scharpf 1997). Some scholars have explored the issue based on case studies (e.g. 
Cash et al. 2006; Pahl-Wostl 2009; McGinnis 2011; Galaz et al. 2016). 
The strength of formal modeling approaches such as the one used here, is 
that they can provide complementary and more precise theoretical insights (c.f. 
Morton 1999). More precisely, the current paper is dedicated to highlight condi-
tions for which polycentric governance is maintained by addressing the following 
specific issues with our formal model:
•	 How to determine cases for which the social network dynamics can be 
influenced? We will identify the properties of the social network – i.e. the 
creation and removal rates of nodes and links – for which there exists (or 
does not exist) efficient policies for preserving the polycentricity of our 
governance system;
222 Jean-Denis Mathias et al.
•	 How to determine when co-management is necessary? We seek to identify 
cases for which co-management is efficient when a single level of govern-
ment fails as well as cases for which co-management is not necessary in 
order to maintain the polycentric governance system;
•	 How to quantify the importance of monitoring for successfully adapting 
the current policy to the state of the network? In our formal modeling, 
we will focus on the necessary time between monitoring the system and 
changing the policy according to the density of nodes and links of the 
network and the impact on the polycentric governance. 
The aim is therefore to address these issues not only in a qualitative way (as done 
by many studies in the literature) but also in a quantitative way with our formal 
model by using a simple social network model. 
For this purpose, we use the conceptual framework on decentralized resource 
governance from a polycentric view described by Andersson and Ostrom (2008) 
and Ostrom (2009) (see Figure 1). The framework focuses on the dynamics of 
the local social system including local resource users and local governments such 
as municipalities. Here local government organizations (say, water user associa-
tions) and local users (e.g. farmers) interact with each other, at times working 
towards a common goal such as preserving the water quality of adjacent rivers 
or lakes.
Central government
Local socio-ecological system
Local ecological system Local social system
Local government Local government
Local resource system
(RS)
Local government
organizations (G)
Local users (U )Local resource units(RU)
Interactions
Interactions
Interactions
Interactions
Interactions
Interactions
Interactions
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for decentralized resource governance in a polycentric 
 governance setting, based on (Andersson and Ostrom 2008) and (Ostrom 2009). Central and 
local governments as well as local government organizations and the local users interact. The 
current study only focuses on the social system of the SES (right side of this diagram).
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Managing a network for preserving a polycentric governance can addressed 
in different ways. Managing a system to achieve an optimal state entails consider-
able risks, as shown by the literature on social-ecological systems (e.g. Gunderson 
1999). While optimization might provide short-term benefits, it can also lead to loss 
of resilience and large-scale collapse of the system of interest (Carpenter et al. 2015). 
Hence rather than optimizing a given objective, managing SES within a range of 
acceptable outcomes might be preferable (Johnson 1999). In our context, we express 
the polycentricity of the governance system as acceptable boundaries represented by 
acceptable densities of nodes and links: we seek to manage our polycentric system 
within these acceptable boundaries instead of optimizing the polycentric properties 
of the governance system. For this purpose, we argue that viability theory (Aubin 
1991; Rougé et al. 2013) is relevant to understand how stylized policies can result 
in “acceptable” ranges of social network properties rather than an “optimal” and 
vulnerable social network. Viability theory computes viable states of the network 
according to the different policy options: if a state of the network is considered as 
viable, it means there is at least a policy that maintains the desirable social network 
properties reflecting the polycentric features of the governance. On the other hand, if 
a state of the network is not viable, it means that there is no policy option for preserv-
ing the polycentric governance represented by the network properties.
More specifically, viability theory is used as a method to compare the 
strengths and weaknesses of two different stylized policy models. More specifi-
cally we explore in what ways central policies affect social network properties 
at the local level. The first model only has one adaptive administrative level. We 
call this model “adaptive one-level” (AOL) policy. The second stylized model is 
also adaptive, but adds one additional level of collaboration here called “adaptive 
co-management” (ACM) policy. These two models hence display two alternative 
policies – one where central policy-makers maintain a higher degree of decision-
making power, and one where this power is decentralized. In addition, we under-
line that both policies are adaptive: decisions are taken according to the states of 
the system. We then explore the impacts of different social network parameters 
on the efficiency of the polycentric system. We use the model to ask: i) How does 
the evolving network affect the properties of the system from a polycentric per-
spective? and ii) Are there any qualitative differences in benefits between the two 
stylized policies from a social network perspective? 
We present in the first section the theoretical framework used in this paper. 
This theoretical framework is based on both adaptive networks and viability the-
ory. Then we present the results in the second section before discussing implica-
tions for network management for maintaining a polycentric governance in a last 
section. 
2. Theoretical framework for maintaining polycentric governance 
In this section, we introduce a network-based approach for conceptualizing 
 governance systems and then for making explicit the problem of maintaining a 
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polycentric governance as a viability problem. Network-based approaches have 
been broadly used in the literature for modeling the dynamics of social interac-
tions, such as “small world” or “scale free” models (Watts and Strogatz 1998; 
Barabási and Albert 1999). The purpose here is to develop a suitable adaptive 
network model adapted to our polycentric governance problem.
2.1. Network structure of the local social system
We consider a resource being governed and exogenous of our model; this resource 
may be water as well as forest or a fishery. As a means to model the interac-
tions between the users of this resource and organizations, we place our study in 
the general context of dynamical social networks (c.f. Ansell 2006; Janssen et al. 
2006; Bodin and Crona 2009). In our case, the nodes consist of local government 
organizations and local actors linked through social links (see next section for 
more details). As a way to explore how these networks change and evolve, nodes 
and edges are not always active and governments may adapt their policies accord-
ing to changing circumstances. For instance, an environmental disaster (such as 
an oil spill) will lead central agents to actively connect or create nodes and edges 
in social networks (through e.g. government subsidies, or policy changes) in order 
to increase the flow of information between social actors (as explained by crisis 
scholars such as Moynihan 2008). These processes are highly dynamic as these 
connections in turn influence how members of the network communicate, share 
management strategies, and shape the future evolution of the network. Inspired by 
Ostrom (2009), we use two types of social nodes (see Figure 2): 
•	 local government organizations (denoted G): several local government 
organizations are implemented in a region. The number of local govern-
ment organizations is denoted NG; 
•	 local users (denoted U): local users consume the natural resources. The 
number of the local users is denoted NU. 
In network theory, links in the adaptive network will represent the processes by 
which the nodes (i.e. users and organizations) interact through e.g. information 
sharing. In what follows, we focus only on the links between the local users and 
the local government organizations and their density DUG. The emergence (and the 
dynamics) of such links is a key issue for polycentric governance, especially in 
multilevel settings (Olsson et al. 2004, 2006). In our model, links correspond to 
relationships and interactions through information sharing, interactions between 
actors, and flows of economic resources. As the literature shows, the creation 
of partnerships can help the emergence of new relationships and interactions 
(Schneider et al. 2003; Lubell 2015) between local users and local government 
organizations yielding substantial benefits for local “common-pool resource” 
problems (Ostrom 1990; Lubell et al. 2002). Such collaborative partnerships are 
successfully effective if actors are committed, and if they expect to extract benefits 
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from these collaborations (Klijn et al. 1995). The outcomes of the interactions in 
these networks are at best effective information sharing, deliberation processes 
that build trust, and/or lobbying activities (Ostrom 2009). These links have been 
proposed to increase the availability of information and the credibility of commit-
ments of actors and finally favor policy agreements (Schneider et al. 2003).
Here, we assume that actions taken by the national and local governments 
change the structure of the network. In real terms, this can be done by finan-
cially supporting collaboration platforms thereby increasing information links, 
designing new policies which make collaborations more or less beneficial (e.g. 
through taxes), or by shifts in perceptions such as an increased sense of urgency 
(Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Olsson et al. 2006). 
Acting through social networks, such as partnerships and local associations, is 
a key aspect of modern governance. Central and local governments may foster or 
undermine the creation of links between local users and local government organi-
zations, and may even if considered necessary contribute to increase the number 
of the local government organizations. An example of this is the adoption of the 
European Water Framework Directive that urges participating states to consider 
the work assumed by a diverse set of water user associations and organizations 
(Muxika et al. 2007). 
We assume that such policies for promoting social interactions are 
 associated with costs. The efforts of the central government for creating new 
Local social system
Local government organizations
Local government organizations (G )
Local user (U )
Local government organizations
Local user
Network modeling
Local social network
Local userLocal userLocal user
Figure 2: Definition of 2-level adaptive networks, inspired by (Ostrom et al. 2007). We assume 
that the local system can be modeled using a simple social network composed of local govern-
ment organizations and local users.
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nodes are denoted 1
Ne  and the efforts of the central government for creating 
new links are denoted 1
Le . For instance, these efforts may focus on the creation 
of new local organizations for preserving ecosystems (creation of nodes) and 
they may also promote the partnership between local users and these local 
organizations (creation of links). However, the efforts might be limited by eco-
nomic reasons (such as limited subsidies) or by other reasons (such as limited 
information activities).
Moreover, local government also develops policies for fostering creation 
of new nodes and links. Therefore, we also consider the efforts of the local 
 government for creating new nodes (denoted 2Ne ) and the efforts of the local 
 government for creating new links (denoted 2Le ). We also consider vertical con-
nections between the central government and local government (e.g. Ruitenbeek 
and Cartier 2001; Folke et al. 2002; Olsson et al. 2004; Berkes 2009). These verti-
cal connections are explored in detail in the next section.
A final assumption is that the local government and the central government 
are engaged in dynamical learning: they know the state of the system (through 
monitoring), and they know how the system responds according to different 
policy scenario (learning). However, we only consider a single loop between 
the outcomes and the governance as illustrated in Figure 3. All learning levels 
(from action level to governance level) are merged in the analysis for the sake 
of simplicity.
Figure 3: Polycentric governance system including a 2-scale adaptive network. We assume 
that the central and the local governments can foster or undermine the presence of nodes and 
links between the local users and the local government organizations according to aggregated 
indicators of the network (the node and link densities for instance).
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2.2. Maintaining a polycentric governance: a viability problem
Government actors in our model have goals they want to achieve and therefore 
also have preferences about the evolving network structure in order to preserve 
polycentric governance. What constitutes “desirable” network properties is a nor-
mative question (Armitage et al. 2008), because it closely depends on the system 
studied. Here we define it as network properties that are able to preserve the poly-
centric character of the system. For maintaining the polycentricity of the system, 
we use the node and link densities as indicators and we define suitable ranges 
from which the node and link densities have to stay, under an associated budget. 
That is, government actors seek:
– to keep the density of local government organizations NG within a specific 
range: the density of local government organizations NG (with respect to 
the number of local users) influences their ability to interact and exchange 
information with local users. In the meantime, new local government 
organizations lead to new operating costs and maintenance costs. We 
therefore limit the number of local government organizations too;
– and to obtain a minimum density of links DUG between local users and 
local government organizations. The density of links DUG between the 
local users and the local government organizations enables them to inter-
act for sharing information or developing activities;
– not to exceed a given budget: maintaining and developing the network 
structure involves costs. Their capacity to maintain and create nodes and 
links is limited by an overall budget.
Therefore, maintaining a polycentric governance system means here satisfying 
constraints defined by network metrics, which is a viability problem mathemati-
cally defined by the viability theory (e.g. Aubin 1991; Rougé et al. 2013; Brias 
et al. 2016; Mathias et al. 2017). This theory enables us to explore issues such 
as these as it allows an elaboration of network properties in a given polycentric 
system. Indeed, we aim at assessing all viable policies (for avoiding a unique 
blueprint) that satisfy polycentric constraints. In practice, the viable states of the 
network are the states for which there is at least a (local and central) policy such 
that the social network keeps the desirable properties. In these states, an adaptive 
multilevel polycentric system is maintained (e.g. Folke et al. 2005). These viable 
states are also associated with policies that adapt according to the state of the 
network. These enable governments to adapt their policies according to the infor-
mation received from monitoring efforts. Our goal is to find these viable policies 
(not necessarily ’optimal’ according to a certain criterion) that indefinitely will 
maintain the network in desirable states. It will give a family of viable options 
which give more flexibility to decision-makers for facing exogenous drivers.
This theory was used in previous works for tackling several environmental 
management issues for the fisheries management (Cury et al. 2005) or for man-
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aging uneven-aged forest (Mathias et al. 2015). Viability theory requires: 1) the 
definition of the properties of interest we want to preserve; 2) indicators or state 
variables that model these properties; 3) defining acceptable outcomes instead of 
defining optimal objectives. The outcomes are: 1) the viable policies that enable 
to preserve the properties of interest and 2) the viable states from which there 
exists at least one viable policy. 
To assess these outcomes, the viability framework needs inputs that are 
closely related to the governance framework used such as the parameters of net-
work dynamics or the monitoring-learning-responding time of central and local 
governments for instance (see Table 1). Figure 4 illustrates the different concepts 
used for defining these inputs and outcomes (Table 2). Mathematical details 
Table 1: Description of the variables used in the current conceptual model.
Name Type  Description  Value
NG  State variable  Number of the local government organizations. We 
want to conserve this value between a minimum and a 
maximum value
 
[0.3;1]
DUG  State variable  Link density between the local government organizations 
and the local users. We want to conserve a minimum 
value. Note that the value is limited to 1 by definition
[0.5;1]
1
Ne  Policy variable  Effort of the central government for promoting the 
creation of the local government organizations
 
[0;0.5]
1
Le  Policy variable  Effort of the central government for promoting the 
creation of links between the local government 
organizations and the local users
 
[0;0.5]
c1  Policy variable  Limit of the total efforts of the central government 
+1 1 1( < )N Le e c
 
[0;0.5]
2
Ne  Policy variable  Effort of the local government for promoting the 
creation of the local government organizations
 
[0;0.5]
2
Le  Policy variable  Effort of the local government for promoting the creation 
of links between the local government organizations and 
the local users
[0;0.5]
c2  Policy variable  Limit of the total efforts of the local government 
+2 2 2( < )N Le e c
 
[0;0.5]
c
 
Policy and state 
variable
 
Limit of the total efforts of the central and the local 
governments +1 2( )c c
 
[0;1]
u
c
 
Policy variable
 
Variation of the limit of the total efforts
 [−0.1;0.1]
∆
t
 
Policy variable
 
Monitoring-learning-responding time: time necessary to 
change the policy
 
1
γ N  Model parameter  Probability to have a new node  0.2
αN  Model parameter  Probability to remove a node  0.1
γL  Model parameter  Probability to have a new link  0.3
αL  Model parameter  Probability to remove a link  0.1
A state variable is a variable which is monitored and used for defining the network properties of interest. 
A policy variable is defined by either the central government or the local government. The model 
parameters are the intrinsic variables of the network dynamics.
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Non-viable
policies
Viable policy
Zone of viable states
A
B
B
Maximum NG
Non viable pathway
Non viable local policy
Viable local policy 1
(associated to viable pathway 1)
Viable local policy 2
(associated to viable pathway 2)
Viable local policy n
(associated to viable pathway n)
Time t
Viable pathway 1
Viable pathway 2
Viable pathway n
Minimum NG
Minimum DUG
Minimum DUG
Minimum e1L
Maximum e1L
Time t
Maximum DUG
A
B
Maximum DUG
UG
-L
in
k 
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UG
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rt 
e
1L
UG
-
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en
sit
y 
D
UG
Local government organization density NG
Boundary K from which the networks properties are not
respected (minimum and maximum of DUG and NG)
Figure 4: Calculation of the viable states. We delimit the properties of the network we want to 
keep (modeled by the boundary K). Four network examples are also represented for illustrat-
ing the properties of interest. The zone of the viable states (the gray zone) corresponds to the 
zone where there exists at least one policy for keeping the properties of the network. In point A, 
there is no policy that keeps the network properties. In point B, there is at least one policy that 
ensures to keep them. This policy is called viable policy. (A) Schematic representation of the 
viable states. (B) Example of viable dynamics of the link density and of the local policy.
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about the calculation of the viable states and the viable policies are available in 
Appendix 1. Once the viable states have been calculated, we have gained access 
to all viable pathways of the network states. However, in order to use this math-
ematical theory, we need a dynamical controlled model of the network structure 
which is the purpose of the next section.
2.3. Changing adaptive network structure
To investigate the dynamics of the resulting governance network, we constructed a 
simple model of how the network structure might change over time. The approach 
here consists in using an aggregated model of the social network. Aggregated 
models capture the dynamics of a random network subjected to the processes 
detailed in previous section (creation of nodes/links etc…). The interest of hav-
ing such aggregated model is that 1) it captures the results of an ABM [i.e. we 
will have the same results with an ABM, see for instance (Bonté et al. 2012)] and 
2) it clearly highlights the dynamical parameters in the aggregated equation; 3) 
there is no stochasticity because it represents a mean field approximation of an 
ABM (it is not necessary to carry out a high number of replicates). Another issue 
is that we can apply mathematical tools based on differential equations (such as 
viability theory) for defining management strategy, which is not possible (or more 
tricky) with ABM. All variables used in the following are summarized in Table 1. 
Equations are written in dimensionless units for the sake of simplicity and the 
dimensions have been normalized in order to keep the values between 0 and 1. We 
seek to model two key features of the network: the number of local government 
organizations NG and the density of links DUG between resource users and local 
government organizations. We choose a constant number of local users NU = 1 
corresponding to a reference density.
Local government organizations, in the adaptive network framework, can 
change in number over time. As explained above, the efforts of central and local 
governments ( 1Ne  and 2Ne ) can create new nodes. We consider γN the rate per unit 
Table 2: Description of the inputs and outcomes used in the viability approach, in the case of 
social network.
Inputs: governance issues  Outcomes: policy features
Desired properties of the network:
maintaining link density and the number of local 
government organizations (green box in Figure 4A) 
 Viable states: 
Network states that enable keeping a 
polycentric system (gray zone in Figure 4A)
Dynamics of network: 
dynamics of links and nodes are described in Eq. 
(1) and (2) 
 Viable pathways:
dynamics of the network for which the 
properties are preserved (Figure 4B). 
Available policies (or policy options):
Policies may depend on the state of the network 
(see blue arrows in Figure 4A). 
 Viable policies: 
government policies associated to the viable 
pathways (Figure 4B)
See also Figure 4 for more details.
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effort of local government for creating new local organizations. The nodes vanish 
at rate αN: some local organizations are removed every year due to high operat-
ing costs or reassignment of spending for example. This leads to the following 
dynamics for the node density NG:
 γ α+ −1 2= ( )N NG N N G
dN
e e N
dt
 (1)
Similarly, local and central governments create links between resource users and 
local governments through efforts 1
Le
 and 2
Le
 respectively. These efforts lead to 
link creation between users and local government at a rate γL per unit of effort. 
In our model, we do not identify which actors these new links involve, but rather 
model the total density of links. Links are also removed at a rate αL: links between 
resource users and local organizations can vanish because of for example changes 
in farmland ownership or in local organizations (reassignment of agents). Writing 
in terms of the density of links DUG yields:
 α γ γ− + + − − +1 2 1 2= ( ) (1 ) ( )L L N NUG UGL UG L UG N
G
dD D
D e e D e e
dt N
 (2)
The link density DUG is 0 when there are no links between users and organiza-
tions, and is equal to 1 when all users are connected with all organizations. We 
see that the creation of nodes decreases the mean density of links (see last term 
of Equation 2) if no efforts are made for the creation of links in the same time 
(second right-term of this equation). It highlights the necessity to balance between 
node creation and link creation of existing nodes.
2.4. The cost of network management
Developing and maintaining networks is constrained by costs. Federalism (such 
as in the USA) is a typical example for which costs are significant because of the 
creation of vertical links between levels of the federal system and horizontal links 
between local organization (Schneider et al. 2003). The key-issue relies in a trade-
off between the transaction costs (for developing and maintaining networks) and 
the benefits of the partnerships (Lubell et al. 2002). In what follows, we consider 
that the local and central governments are constrained in achieving these goals by 
their budgets, b1 and b2, respectively. Their total expenditures cannot exceed these 
budgets: +1 1 1<
N Le e b  and +2 2 2< .
N Le e b  It means that, in the network dynamics, 
we include all costs (transaction costs as well as creation of new organizations) 
in the efforts 1 1 2 2( ,  ,  ,  ),N L N Le e e e limited by b1 and b2. Although we acknowledge 
that creating and maintaining networks involve a lot of social processes (such as 
beliefs, values, trusts etc…), we limit our study to these costs in this first attempt 
of formalization.
Central and local governments are limited to the same total budgets at each 
point in time 1 2[ ( ) = ( )].b t b t  The total available budget (denoted b) represents the 
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sum of the budgets of the central and the local governments +1 2( = ).b b b  Finally, 
we assume that the budgets of the central and local governments evolve in the 
 
same way    1 2=
db db
dt dt
 yielding the evolution of the total budget b(t) as follows:
 
( )
= b
db t
u
dt
 (3)
with a minimum and a maximum value of ub: the local and central governments 
have a limited capacity to change their budget allocated to their “social network” 
policy.
Governments can act on the social network by choosing a ∆
t
-year strategy 
regarding their levels of expenditure. These can be adapted every ∆
t
 years. ∆
t
 
corresponds to the time that governments have available for monitoring (yield-
ing knowledge on the state of the network), learning (knowledge on the effect of 
the different policy options) and responding (decision to apply a new adequate 
policy). It consists of choosing a strategy the first year and then ‘waiting’ for the 
next ∆
t
 years in order to decide whether or not to change the policy (i.e. through 
monitoring and learning). This timeframe corresponds to a “monitoring-learning-
responding” time.
2.5. Modeling stylized policies
We define the following reference scenarios (see Table 3) to explore the differ-
ences between the stylized policies benefits from a social network perspective:
•	 no adaptive policy scenario: central and the local governments policies 
do not evolve in time: they kept the same policy independently from the 
network state; 
Table 3: Description of reference policy scenarios.
Scenario name   Description   Parameter values
No adaptive policy
 
Central and local policies are constant 
over time
 
2 2 constant v= = alues
N Le e
1 1 constant v= = alues
N Le e
Adaptive one-level 
(AOL) policy 
Efforts by central government are 
adaptive. Those of the local government 
are constant over time
 
2 2 constant v= = alues
N Le e
 
1 1 variable v, = alues
N Le e
Adaptive co-
management 
(ACM) policy
 
The efforts of the central and the local 
governments are adaptive in an interactive 
way. They are conjointly managed
 
+1 2 variable va s= lue
N Ne e
+1 2 variable va s= lue
L Le e
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•	 adaptive one-level (AOL) policy scenario: central government efforts are 
adaptive depending on changes in network states. Local efforts are con-
stant and not adaptive.1 
•	 adaptive co-management (ACM) policy scenario: the efforts of the local 
and the central governments are adaptive in an interactive way: central 
and local governments are connected across levels and scales. It is impor-
tant to note that central and local governments don’t necessarily follow the 
same strategy especially when there is no benefits to cooperate yielding 
independent (and multiple) strategies. 
The states of the network for which there are, at least, a central and a local policy 
(called viable policies) that preserve these properties are called ‘viable states’ in 
what follows. The higher the number of viable states is, the higher the viability of 
the governance system is.
3. Results
3.1. What are the initial states from which the polycentric governance can 
be achieved and maintained?
Using the parameters described in the previous section, we calculated the viable 
states of the network associated to each scenario defined above (see Appendix 1 
for mathematical details). These viable states are represented in Figure 5 (blue 
points). 
We recall that a viable state means that there is at least a strategy that enables 
to preserve the polycentric system. The number of viable states is also an impor-
tant indicator: for a given policy, it means how this policy is flexible for main-
taining our objectives. The number of viable states is simply represented by the 
kernel size. For the sake of clarity, the viable states are represented according to 
the density of local governments organizations (NG), the density of ‘local users 
– local government organization’ link (DUG) and the total budget b. In the case 
of the “no adaptive policy scenario” (Figure 5A), there are no viable states. That 
is, no strategy has been found that enables governments to maintain the network 
properties. This is due to the fact that chosen parameters yield a social network 
that does not comply with the properties of interest. However, in the case of the 
adaptive policy scenarios (AOL and ACM, Figure 5B and C), our results show 
viable states.
In the latter two cases, the number of viable states increases according to the 
total available budget. The higher the available budget is, the higher the viability 
of the network is. In addition, the network exhibits 71% of viable states for the 
AOL strategy against 86% for the ACM strategy. A part of the budget is fixed in 
1
 Note that considering the opposite case (constant central efforts and adaptive local efforts) will give 
similar results in our case due to the same limited capacity of acting of the governments;
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Figure 5: Viable states (blue points) of the network according to the reference scenarios. (A) No 
adaptive policy scenario (no viable states), (B) AOL scenario (71% of the network states are 
viable), and (C) ACM scenario (86% of the network states are viable).
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the case of the AOL policy, which decreases the capacity of the governments to 
adapt their policies to changing circumstances (through monitoring and policy 
learning). In the ACM policy scenario, the local and the central governments are 
able to pool together their efforts for maintaining the network properties. This par-
allels wider insights in the governance literature about the complementary poten-
tial of multiple levels in network governance (e.g. Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; 
Duit and Galaz 2008). 
To better understand these results, an example of the evolution of the network 
is represented in Figures 5C and 6. The initial network exhibits a high node den-
sity (NG = 0.9) and a high link density (DUG = 0.9) but presents few resources (b = 
0.1). The challenge from the perspective of central policy makers is to maintain 
a polycentric network structure despite few available resources. In this case, a 
viable policy is possible in the case of the ACM scenario, but not in AOL scenario.
Why the ACM case (unlike the AOL case) yields a viable policy, can also be 
represented in Figure 5C. The evolution of the network follows the boundary of 
viable states, and then converges to a network with low values of node and link 
densities and a high value of the total budget. In this case, governments need high 
funds to maintain the network properties: the entire available budget is consumed. 
Note that away from the boundary of the viable states, not all the budget is nec-
essarily consumed. The dynamics are more detailed in Figure 6. Here, the local 
and central governments jointly increase their budgets in order to reach this net-
work state. Figure 7 shows the associated viable policy for explaining difference 
between the AOL and ACM scenarios. Initially for the ACM case, the local and 
the central governments don’t put their efforts on node creation (i.e. the total node 
effort equals 0) in order to focus all efforts on creating links. This is not possible 
in the AOL scenario because parts of local government efforts are used for node 
creation initially. We recall that policies represented in Figures 6 and 7 are only 
ones among a family of policies. Here, for instance, node efforts oscillate around 
an equilibrium (policies may oscillate in the case of variable annual subventions 
for instance) as well as they can be constant.
3.2. How do network parameters affect the viability of the policies?
In what follows, the influences of the creation and removal rates of nodes and 
links (γL, γN, αL,  αN) on the preservation of the polycentric properties are studied. 
Extreme values of these parameters are not expected to lead to significant differ-
ences between the ACM and AOL scenarios because whatever the type of policy 
cooperation, local and central governments will have a weak influence on the 
network evolution due to its own dynamics. If the node creation rate is high, no 
cooperation is necessary as well as the case of very low creation rate for which 
cooperation will be not sufficient for maintaining the polycentric properties of the 
network. However, we also expect the existence of cases where central and local 
governments are forced to adopt an ACM policy to preserve the desired network 
properties. Figure 8 presents the percentage of viable states for different param-
eter values for both policy scenarios.
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to 0.1. In this case, all available budgets are consumed. (A) Node dynamics, (B) link dynamics, 
and (C) budget dynamics.
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The differences between both policies are significant when link creation and link 
removal rates are changed (γL and αL). Indeed, the parameters of the link dynam-
ics are such that they have a significant influence on the difference between both 
policies. This difference is most extreme when the link creation rate γL is 0.25 for 
which there is no viable state for the AOL case, whilst there are 77% of viable states 
for the ACM scenario. Even with when high levels of resources are available, local 
and the central governments are unable to pool together their resources in the AOL 
scenario thereby creating inefficient policies. On the other hand, when the tension 
largely decreases (the network tends naturally to preserve its properties), the differ-
ence between the AOL and ACM policies decreases: the cooperation between the 
local and central governments gives similar results than non-cooperative strategy in 
this case. The ACM scenario is less sensitive to link creation and removal (γL and 
αL) because the two governments can compensate lack of investment of the other 
government on link creation (see Appendix 2 for more details).
However, the value of the node creation rate γN does not have a significant 
influence on both the ACM and AOL policies. The node efforts of the local and 
central governments may (partially) compensate a too low node creation: they 
are of the same order of magnitude. The value of the node removal rate αN shows 
a higher influence but the difference between the ACM and the AOL policies 
reaches 15% of viable states unlike 77% in the case of the γL-influence. 
3.3. How does the monitoring-learning-responding timeframe affect 
the viability of the policies?
The influence of the monitoring-learning-responding time ∆
t
 to change policy (see 
Figure 9) is explored below. As explained before, it corresponds to the time neces-
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Figure 8: (continued)
sary for the local and central governments to monitor, learn and react. Actors may 
adapt their policies every ∆
t
 years. The number of viable states decreases in the 
same way for both the AOL and ACM scenarios. There is a loss of 25% of viable 
states between ∆
t
 = 1 and ∆
t
 = 5. Indeed, adapting policies to the perceived state of 
the network through monitoring and learning enables the governments to preserve 
desired network properties. This capacity to adapt may contribute to balance the 
lack of multilevel collaboration.
4. Implications for network management
4.1. Adaptive co-management is not always necessary
Determining situations for which cooperation between governments leads to sub-
stantial benefits constitutes a challenging issue for decision makers. Our nested 
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conceptual model allows us to compare two stylized policies where central gov-
ernments either maintain or decentralize decision-making power. Both strategies 
yield different results due to the level of cooperation. In some cases, local and cen-
tral governments can maintain the desired network properties only with an ACM 
approach: for instance, our results show that ACM is required in the case of low 
creation of link (γL = 0.25). This clearly indicates that cooperation between central 
and local governments may yield to substantial benefits in order to preserve the 
polycentric properties of the system in this case. However, cooperation benefits 
clearly depend on both the acting capacity of the governments and on evolving 
network properties: if the acting capacity of governments has a limited influence 
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Figure 8: Percentage of states within the desired region that are viable according to scenarios 
and parameter values. AOL, adaptive one-level policy. ACM, adaptive co-management policy. 
(A) Influence of the link creation rate γL, (B) Influence of the link removal rate αL, (C) Influence 
of the node creation rate γN, and (D) Influence of the node removal rate αN.
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on the network dynamics, cooperation between governments has a limited effect. 
For instance, in our case study, such cases correspond to social networks with a 
high node removal rate. In this case, cooperation between governments cannot 
counterbalance the node removal. On the other hand, there are many situations 
for which ACM does not gain benefits: both AOL and ACM policies are viable 
because there is no tension in terms of maintaining the polycentric governance. 
Identifying such cases constitutes a great challenge for both scholars and policy-
makers in order to decide when it is useful to implement ACM policies. In addi-
tion, ACM and social networks completely interact: social networks constitute the 
most influential factor that contributes to success of ACM (Plummer et al. 2012) 
and social networks may favor ACM. The first approach we propose may help 
better understand these interactions between ACM and social networks.
4.2. Investing in network monitoring for reactive decision-making
Our conceptual approach also shows the need to integrate the network dynam-
ics in the decision-making process in order to create social links “at the right 
time, around the right issues” and keep together modes of multilevel governance 
(Westley 2002; Olsson et al. 2004). Integrating the network dynamics requires 
monitoring and learning processes that constitute other key issues in polycen-
tric governance. Monitoring and learning may help governments to take the right 
decision at the right time (Pahl-Wostl 2009) as they constitute one of the basis of 
adaptive co-management (Ruitenbeek and Cartier 2001; Folke et al. 2002; Olsson 
et al. 2004; Berkes 2009) and require interaction across levels (Armitage et al. 
2008). Although we only considered learning from two indicators monitored (link 
and node densities), our results show that the efficiency of these monitoring and 
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to change policy. AOL, adaptive one-level policy; ACM, adaptive co-management policy.
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learning on the policy impacts clearly depends on the time necessary for govern-
ments to adapt their policy: the lower the value of this time is, the higher the 
viability of the governance system is. For instance, the model highlights that if 
we postpone the creation of links or nodes (we double the monitoring-learning-
responding time for instance, see Figure 9), we lose 10% of viable states. In these 
cases, we can maintain the properties of the social network only with short-term 
responses showing the necessity to create the link (or the node) at the right time 
before the system evolves (dynamical system). However, monitoring could be 
difficult in practice, yielding to no policy adaptation. It may lead to a lack of learn-
ing and therefore may decrease the adaptive capacity of governments as it is the 
case in our example when the monitoring-learning-responding time is large. Here 
again, it is necessary to identify the trade-off between monitoring and its impact 
on the viability policies. For instance, the gain (in terms of viability) is more 
significant when we decrease small values of monitoring time Dt (see Figure 9).
4.3. Getting flexibility for mitigating exogenous drivers
Once cooperation is well established, the policies decided by governments may 
not be viable due to hazards and surprises (Gunderson 1999). In order to cope 
with such hazards, we argue that governments must have different policy options 
instead of a unique policy optimized according a given criterion to, such as an 
economic objective for instance. The viability approach used in this paper may 
tackle this issue by offering not only the viable states but also all the viable  policies 
 associated to these viable states. Having access to all viable policies (and not only 
one) may contribute to increase adaptive capacity and flexibility of governments 
and enable them to face to exogenous stresses (Mathias et al. 2015). In the viabil-
ity set, there are several options for decision-makers yielding this flexibility: there 
is not a unique blueprint like optimal decision but a diversity of solutions (such 
as Figure 7 that shows an example of viable policy among all available viable 
policies). In case of exogenous stresses, if the system stays within the viability 
set, we know that we have different options in order to preserve polycentric prop-
erties. However, if stresses push the system outside of the viability set, there is 
no strategy that guarantees to keep polycentric properties. Finally, we argue that 
this first attempt of mathematical formalization is a first step towards integrating 
node-link models of institutions in the design of efficient multi-level policies for 
the management of socio-ecological systems.
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Appendix 1 Mathematical basis of the viability approach: the 
 viability theory
The viability theory aims to preserve some qualities of a dynamical system that 
evolves in a set of desired states symbolized by K (Aubin 1991). In the viability 
framework, an important innovation is to introduce controls to explicitly account 
for the possibility to act on the system: controls are not fixed beforehand. Indeed, 
the purpose is to find suitable strategies that will maintain indefinitely the proper-
ties of our social network within K (see Figure 4). In discrete time, this means that 
at each time step, there is a set of possible controls that one must choose from. 
Noting in general x
t
∈X the state of the system at date t and u
t
∈U its controls, a 
typical controlled discrete-time dynamical system can be written as: 
+1 = ( , )t t tx g x u
u
t
 is a vector that may contain several control variables. One objective of the 
viability theory is to determine which are the desirable states of the social net-
work for which the dynamics can keep the network properties indefinitively. This 
objective to keep relevant network properties is achieved through control strate-
gies u
t
. A strategy can be represented by a function which associates a control u
t
 to 
any date t and to any state x. These controls are, in our case, based on the efforts of 
governments for creating nodes and links. The set of all the states for which there 
is, at least, a control strategy such that the system can be maintained indefinitively 
inside the set of desirable states is called the ‘viability set’ or the ‘viability kernel’ 
Viab(K). The viability kernel Viab(K) is composed of all initial states of the net-
work for which there is at least a sequence of action policies u
t
 which influences 
the evolution of x
t
 at time t and allows the system to stay within this same viability 
kernel. In discrete time, it can be formally defined as the set of initial states for 
which there exists a trajectory that does not leave K: 
{ }∈ ∀ ∃ ∀ ≥ ∈0 0( ) = | > 0, , 0, = ( , )t fViab K x K t f t x g t x K  
Within the viability kernel, the system is maintained in a desirable for so long as it 
is not disturbed: it is the set of all the viable states. The computation of a viability 
kernel also yields the set of controls which maintain the system, which are called 
the viable controls. Thus, it incorporates the impacts of management policies, and 
implicitly optimizes them. For the calculation, the Saint-Pierre’s algorithm has 
been used (Saint-Pierre 1994). 
Appendix 2 Influence of the link creation rate γL
The lower the value is, the higher the tension becomes. Indeed, when this value 
decreases governments have to report their efforts of the link creation in order 
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to preserve the network properties (in terms of link density). Figure 10 presents 
viability kernels for different values of γL and for both types of management.
For γL = 0.25, there is no strategy for preserving the link density in the case of 
AOL policy scenario. Indeed, in this case, the tension is too important even in the case 
of high budget for the AOL strategy: only an ACM strategy enables to maintain the 
properties of the network. Then, when the tension decreases, the difference between 
the AOL and the ACM policies decreases too in terms of number of viable states. 
Figure 10: Viable states according to scenarii and γL. AOL, adaptive one-level policy; ACM, 
adaptive co-management policy. (A) AOL (0% of viable states), γL = 0.25, (B) ACM (77% of 
viable states), γL = 0.25, (C) AOL (71% of viable states), γL = 0.3, (D) ACM (86% of viable 
states), γL = 0.3, (E) AOL (80% of viable states), γL = 0.35, and (F) ACM (90% of viable states), 
γL = 0.35.
